A four-layer decentralized stack - dPKI, secure enclaves, hybrid wallets and edge enforcement - eliminating the God View at the speed of the network.

Traditional Zero Trust architectures centralize the Policy Decision Point (PDP), aggregating sensitive user metadata into a single honeypot and a single point of failure. dZTA dissolves that model for Mobile Edge Computing.
Sealed on-device enclaves hold identity keys and run the prover logic — shielded from the operating system, malware, and cloud compromise. Personal data never leaves the mobile device.
Decentralized Identifiers (DIDs) and Verifiable Credentials (VCs) are standardized on W3C models, while Zero-Knowledge Proofs authorize access without ever revealing the underlying data.
Distributed validators agree on policy while local Envoy sidecars enforce sub-50ms decisions at the Mobile Edge — strict, ultra-low-latency access control without cloud routing.
Local roots of trust, standardized cryptographic identities, abstract mathematical verification, and edge proxy enforcement — working as one integrated system.
An enterprise permissioned blockchain network acting as the decentralized Public Key Infrastructure (dPKI). It stores immutable W3C DID Documents, network-wide access control chaincode, organization channels, Certificate Authorities, and real-time cryptographic revocation accumulators.
Hardware-level CPU isolation (such as ARM TrustZone) secures device identity keys away from the main phone operating system — preventing malware extraction and computing hidden witness vectors for proofs.
Standardizes device statements using W3C DIDs and cryptographically signed Verifiable Credentials. Pairwise Peer DIDs (did:peer) establish isolated network-relationship keys, eliminating user location tracking across edge nodes.
Compiled Circom arithmetic circuits (rank-1 constraint systems) parse hidden witness parameters and generate highly compressed Groth16/Plonk zk-SNARK proofs (π) — decoupling access authorization from plain-text identity tracing.
Cloud-native Envoy Proxy sidecars deployed alongside localized edge microservices. The sidecar intercepts raw ingress traffic, evaluates inbound ZKP payloads locally using a memory-cached Verifying Key synced from Layer 1a, and enforces sub-50ms access decisions without cloud routing.
Native Aries excels at AnonCreds, but AnonCreds are cryptographically distinct from the Groth16/Plonk zk-SNARKs that Edge enforcement expects. The wallet must therefore split into two cooperating layers.
Handles DIDComm v2 messaging pipelines, out-of-band credential offers from the organization issuer, and secure storage of the JSON-LD / AnonCreds credential payload inside the local wallet.
Intercepts the raw data inside the wallet, securely feeds it to the phone's hardware enclave (Layer 1b), and runs the prover() to output the SNARK coordinates the Envoy sidecar expects.
Note: If the hybrid method fails due to cryptographic differences, manual wallet coding will be required — forcing manual handling of every call to Layers 1a, 1b, and 3. This is the single highest-risk decision point in the framework.
DNS routing engine, networking endpoints, channel ledger, CouchDB state, orderers, organization authorities and peers, plus the test chaincode are complete. Main chaincode waits on Layer 3 parameters; the revocation list is deployed and empty.
Deliberately skipped until last: this layer requires a fully functional Android / iOS application, and every parameter and mathematical function must be finalized by the preceding layers first.
The next layer to be implemented. Setup is underway: encrypted Local_wallet.db, pairwise did:peer generator, and the W3C Verifiable Credential assertion app remain to be built.
Role_verification.wasm circuit, the policy proving key (pk) asset, and the embedded snarkjs WebAssembly prover engine are the three components yet to be built in this layer.
Mobile application layer: custom HTTP client with header injection, app transport layer protocol handler, and dynamic nonce handshake manager. Edge application layer: target core microservice (Web/gRPC), Envoy Proxy traffic interception, and the custom Wasm/Rust ExAuthz filter plugin.
Each layer runs on a different protocol or host abstraction, so the endpoint service binds them together — if it fails, the entire system fails.